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Public Service Mall as Local Governance Innovation in a Frontier Region: Evidence From the First One-Stop Shop in Papua, Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

The distribution of Indonesia's Public Service Mall (Mal Pelayanan Publik, MPP) has been found to be uneven, with a higher concentration of these facilities observed in the more affluent western regions of the country. This study examines the Jayapura City MPP, inaugurated in May 2023 as the first MPP in the Land of Papua, and asks how the innovation was constituted, how the participation of its twenty-one institutions is formally designed, and what sustains and constrains it. A qualitative instrumental single-case design is utilized, drawing on nine core policy documents for 2022–2024 and national statistics to 2025. The corpus, which consists of regulatory instruments rather than accounts given by actors, is analyzed as institutional design analysis confined to rules in form. Constructs presupposing access to actors are excluded rather than inferred. The documentation reveals that approximately one hundred services have been consolidated in one location, but it appears this was achieved through co-location rather than integration. There is an absence of inter-agency data interoperability, and the one independent field study reports its absence in practice. The deficit is clearly defined in the rules as they are written. It is evident that a mayoral regulation lacks the authority to impose binding obligations on the four central vertical agencies that provide essential services to citizens. Furthermore, the existing cooperation agreements conspicuously fail to stipulate enforceable service standards, sanctions, dispute mechanisms, or review schedules. Consequently, participation depends on ongoing consent. A pre-specified search did not yield a published measurement of performance; relative advantage is asserted by adopters and measured privately, if at all, and no claim is made that citizens have obtained it. The hypothesis is that continuity is contingent on documented executive sponsorship and central supervision, rather than fiscal capacity. This proposition is advanced for comparative testing. The study posits that legal consolidation, asset tenure, digitalization, and the publication of performance data should be given due consideration.

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■ INTRODUCTION

The integration of public services in a single location, known as the 'one-stop shop', has become a widespread administrative reform agenda, adopted by over seventy countries in response to bureaucratic fragmentation (Fredriksson, 2020). Based on the principles of New Public Management, this model adapts the private-sector customer orientation to make services more accessible to citizens. It also addresses the fragmentation that these reforms ironically produced (Askim et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2021). Cross-national experience suggests that service integration can reduce citizens' transaction costs, shorten service times, and improve perceptions of the government. Examples include the Brazilian Poupatempo service (Fredriksson, 2020), Kenyan Huduma Centers (Kipyego et al., 2026), and Bangladeshi Union Digital Centers (Bhuiyan & Abrar, 2023). However, the success of such integration depends on data interoperability, political leadership, and inter-agency coordination (World Bank, 2018).

A review of the literature on this topic reveals three converging strands. First, quasi-

experimental studies and case studies show that integrated citizen service centers can reduce waiting times and petty corruption (Fredriksson, 2020; Kipyego et al., 2026). However, the sustainability of such centers is limited by financing issues and dependence on central political support. Secondly, studies based on information systems success models show that citizen satisfaction and trust in digital government are influenced by the quality of systems, information, and services, with this effect being moderated by the digital divide and government responsiveness (Asmawanti et al., 2025; Chan et al., 2021; Mo & Beh, 2025). Third, and most controversially, the model's transferability to settings in developing countries is disputed. While some studies posit that integration can act as a catalyst for inclusion (Romero et al., 2022), others contend that reform outcomes often plateau at the formal stage in contexts characterized by institutional voids, infrastructure limitations, and inadequate human resource capacity (Aleisa, 2024; Bhuiyan & Abrar, 2023; Meiyanti et al., 2019).

In Indonesia, Law No. 25 of 2009 on Public Services governs service integration, implemented through Ministerial Regulation No. 23 of 2017. The Public Service Mall (Mal Pelayanan Publik, MPP) is defined as an extension of the One-Stop Integrated Services (PTSP) function. The MPP integrates the services of central institutions, vertical agencies, state-owned enterprises, and private sector enterprises, consolidating them under a single entity (Peraturan Menteri PANRB, 2017). The matter was elevated to the level of a presidential regulation, and technical guidelines were issued under a ministerial regulation (Peraturan Menteri PANRB, 2021; Peraturan Presiden, 2021). Under this strengthened framework, the program expanded significantly, increasing from three pilot sites in 2017 to 305 locations by the end of 2025. This expansion encompassed approximately 60 percent of regencies and cities (Kementerian PANRB, 2022, 2025). Nevertheless, the implementation process has been marked by significant disparities. The target of universal coverage by 2024 was not met, and the distribution of provisions remains predominantly concentrated in western Indonesia (Ariyanti et al., 2024).

As demonstrated in Figure 1, this concentration is indicative of the presence of the substance in question. By the end of 2024, the proportion of regencies and cities in each island region with an MPP was measured. Coverage ranged from about four in five localities in Java to fewer than one in thirty in Maluku and Papua. This represented a ratio of more than twenty-five to one between the two extremes. Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and the Bali–Nusa Tenggara islands occupy a middle band of between one-third and one-half. The deficit in the east cannot be attributed solely to a smaller population; rather, it reflects the differing probability that any given locality has access to an integrated service facility. The Jayapura City MPP is one of only two units recorded in the entire Maluku–Papua region during this period, which renders it instructive rather than representative.

The present study is innovative in three




Figure 1. Share of regencies and cities with an mpp by island region, end of 2024

distinct ways. First, empirical research on service innovation in disadvantaged, frontier, and outermost regions such as Papua is scarce. Papua provinces face significant geographical challenges, inadequate technological infrastructure, and limited digital literacy among public servants (Wagola et al., 2023). Only on 19 May 2023, when Jayapura City inaugurated its facility, was the first MPP acquired, making it the 120th nationally (Kementerian PANRB, 2023). The Indonesian MPP scholarship has concentrated on regions that have demonstrated established fiscal and infrastructural capacity, including Probolinggo, Samarinda, Sumedang, and Malang (Latupeirissa et al., 2024; Rahayu et al., 2022). In principle, most MPP studies adopt a service-quality or policy-implementation lens. However, few studies interrogate the legal and institutional design of the arrangement itself, including the instruments that create it, the parties bound by those instruments, and the consequences of non-performance. This condition underpins the deepening of adoption. In the international literature, no one has examined transferability to low-capacity settings in eastern Indonesia.

The present study addresses these gaps by combining public sector innovation theory, rooted in the diffusion of innovations tradition, with institutional design analysis. The former standpoint argues that adoption is influenced by several factors, including relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability (Momen & Ferdous, 2023; Rogers, 1995). The latter examines how two or more organizations work together as a set of rules. It asks what legal power each part has, who it is for, what obligation it creates, and what happens if it is not followed (Ostrom, 2005). The choice of the second framework follows from the character of the evidence rather than from preference. Institutional analysis distinguishes rules-in-form, the rules as written and formally enacted, from rules-in-use, the rules as they are actually practiced (Lowndes & Roberts, 2013; Ostrom, 2005). A corpus of regulations and signed agreements constitutes a complete and authoritative record of the former, yet no record whatsoever of the latter. The present study explores frameworks that place relational processes at their core. Such frameworks encompass the dialogue, trust-building, and brokering that collaborative governance theory treats as the engine of collective capacity (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012). Consequently, it cannot be operationalized on such a corpus without inferring conduct from its formal traces. Rather than incorporate these constructs into the analysis and report them as having only a weak evidence base, this study excludes them, thereby confining its claims to rules-in-form. The restriction is not solely a concession to the evidence; as the analysis demonstrates, the design deficit that holds the Jayapura MPP at co-location is fully legible in the rules as written and requires no behavioral evidence to establish. Collaborative governance is accordingly engaged in the discussion as the body of theory these findings qualify, not as the instrument through which the corpus is read.

In consideration of the phenomena, theoretical framework, and research gap previously delineated, the objective of this study is to respond to the following research question: (1) How was the Jayapura City MPP constituted as a local governance innovation, and how far do the diffusion attributes of relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability account for its adoption? (2) How is the participation of the twenty-one institutions formally designed, by which instruments, over which addressees, and with what obligations and enforcement provisions, and how far can that design reach the central vertical agencies? (3) What factors drive and constrain the sustainability of the innovation in a frontier region, and what do they imply for the distinction between symbolic adoption and substantive integration?

The three questions are addressed in the sections of the analysis labeled accordingly. The study contributes to the existing literature on service integration by offering an analysis from the perspective of a frontier region. Furthermore, it offers empirical evidence that may inform the replication of MPP policy across the Papua region.

■ METHOD

Research Subjects and Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis is the Jayapura City MPP as an institutional arrangement, rather than any individual actor within it. The research subjects were the twenty-one institutions that signed the cooperation agreements, including twelve regional apparatus organizations, four central vertical agencies, three state- and region-owned enterprises, and two social insurance administrators. The Jayapura City Investment and One-Stop Integrated Services Agency (DPMPTSP) organized the study, and the Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform (PANRB) served as the supervising authority.

No human informants were enrolled in the study. The study did not involve interviews, focus groups, or participant observation, nor did it survey any citizen users. Consequently,

the subjects enter the analysis solely as institutional actors inscribed in official documents, and their positions are known through the commitments they have signed rather than through their words or actions. The decision was informed by the existence of a comprehensive and authoritative documentary record for the 2022–2024 period, encompassing planning, inauguration, and early operation. The consequences for what may be legitimately claimed are set out in the subsection on trustworthiness below and, more fully, in the limitations of the study.

Research Design and Approach

The present study adopted a qualitative, single-case instrumental design, conducted as an institutional design analysis of a documentary corpus. The objective of this study is to establish the manner in which the Jayapura City MPP was constituted in rule, and the limits of that rule structure, rather than to test relationships among variables statistically. No causal or correlational inference is intended in any part of the analysis. The selection of a single-case design was made on the basis that the Jayapura MPP constitutes a unique and critical case, insofar as it is the inaugural MPP in the Land of Papua. This offers a valuable opportunity to understand service innovation under resource constraints (Yin, 2018). The analytical posture necessitates a preliminary statement because it deviates from the interpretive framing that prevails in Indonesian MPP research (Ariyanti et al., 2024; Hadi et al., 2020). The interpretive design is realized through engagement with actors, a process that this study did not observe. It did not enroll any informants or observe any practice. Rather than relying on approximate interpretation from textual traces, the study limits its approach to findings established by the instruments themselves. The documentation presented here, which comprised a presidential regulation, two ministerial regulations, a mayoral regulation, and signed cooperation agreements, does not constitute mere reports about an institution. Instead, it is the institution's constitutive rules and can be interpreted directly by their intended recipients concerning their obligations and enforcement provisions. From this perspective, the corpus can be regarded as a robust indicator of another kind of evidence, rather than merely a weak substitute. In fact, the corpus can be considered the primary and most suitable evidence for the specific question being investigated. However, the text does not provide any account of rules-in-use, nor does it offer one.

Data Collection

Documents were selected purposively to identify sources that were both highly relevant to and information-rich with respect to the research questions. The inclusion criteria were as follows: direct relevance to the establishment or operation of the Jayapura City MPP, source authority (issuance by an official government institution), and coverage from 2022 to 2024. Documents that made only a passing reference to the MPP, and secondary media reports that contributed no primary information to an official source, were excluded from consideration. The collection followed documentary and archival research, which entailed retrieving each document, verifying its issuing authority and date, and extracting passages bearing on institutional design, participation, service scope, and constraints. The final corpus comprises the nine core documents set out in Table 1, complemented by national policy statistics on MPP expansion up to December 2025 that situate the case within its national context. Each analytical assertion presented in the subsequent section is supported by a specific item in the aforementioned table, to which it is numbered.

Search for Service-Performance Data

The relative advantage attribute concerns benefits realized by users rather than provisions written into instruments, and therefore requires a different kind of evidence from the rest of the corpus. A separate and pre-specified search was accordingly conducted for quantitative performance data on the Jayapura City MPP, distinct from the purposive document search described above. We searched six classes of sources in the first half of 2026, selected because each represents a conventional location where such data would typically be found. As illustrated in Table 2, the sources, the metric each would have supplied, and the result are documented.

The search yielded no results for a community satisfaction index, service-time or queue measurement, or a monthly or annual transaction-volume series specific to the Jayapura City MPP. The queue-management records maintained at the site are not subject to publication, and, as outlined in the analysis, their current format would not accurately document a citizen's progression through a series of desks. The Ombudsman assessments are the sole external instrument that reaches the locality, and their limitation is instructive rather than incidental: they establish whether service standards, facilities, complaint channels, and

Table 1. Composition of the documentary corpus

No.	Document	Year	Issuing authority	Analytical function
1	Presidential Regulation No. 89 of 2021 on the Administration of Public Service Malls	2021	President of the Republic of Indonesia	National legal basis; mandate and scope
2	Ministerial Regulation PANRB No. 23 of 2017 on the Administration of Public Service Malls	2017	Ministry of PANRB	Original operational definition of the MPP
3	Ministerial Regulation PANRB No. 92 of 2021 on Technical Guidelines for MPP Administration	2021	Ministry of PANRB	Technical rules for administration and service scope
4	Jayapura mayoral regulation on the administration of the city MPP	2023	Jayapura City Government	Local mandate; designation of DPMPTSP as organizer
5	Cooperation agreements signed by 21 institutions on 26 January 2023	2023	DPMPTSP Jayapura City and partner institutions	Composition of the collaboration; service commitments
6	Ministry release on the simultaneous inauguration of 26 MPPs	2022	Ministry of PANRB	National expansion trajectory before the case
7	Ministry release on the inauguration of the first MPP in the Land of Papua	2023	Ministry of PANRB	Chronology; service and institution counts; observability
8	Ministry release on the optimization of the Digital MPP in 24 regions	2024	Ministry of PANRB	Digitalization policy and selection of pilot sites
9	Ministry year-end report on public service and digital transformation	2025	Ministry of PANRB	Cumulative coverage statistics to December 2025

officer competence are in place, which is a question about the conditions of delivery, not the efficiency the MPP model promises.

Two consequences are relevant here, and they are addressed in the following sections. Methodologically, the result limits the claims that can be made regarding relative advantage, and the analysis explicitly recognizes this limit rather than addressing it through the model's design logic. In essence, the absence of evidence does not constitute a neutral fact concerning its availability. Comparable facilities in regions with superior resources routinely disclose transaction counts. For instance, the Banda Aceh MPP reported over seventy thousand services delivered through thirty-three participating institutions during the initial ten months of 2024, while the Yogyakarta MPP documented approximately eighty-five thousand visits and close to twenty thousand permits issued in 2022. Consequently, the absence of data in Jayapura suggests a discrepancy in measurement practices rather than an inherent characteristic of the format. This observation is then developed as a finding in the analysis.

It is imperative that one qualification to that result is entered here, rather than at a later point. The search yielded a solitary independent study of the case, namely an IPDN diploma thesis (Mirino, 2025). The present study examined the facility's effectiveness through fourteen semi-structured interviews with DPMPTSP officials, counter staff, and service users, in addition to site observation. The document is classified as grey literature, as it was authored by a student under the supervision of a designated academic figure and deposited in an institutional repository. Notably, it has not undergone the peer review process typically associated with scholarly publications. The document acknowledges that

Table 2. Sources searched for service-performance data on the Jayapura city MPP

Source class	Issuing body	Metric it would have supplied	Result of search
Community Satisfaction Survey (SKM) reports required under Ministerial Regulation PANRB No. 14 of 2017	Service unit: DPMPTSP as organizer	Composite satisfaction index and per-element scores for the facility	No report specific to the Jayapura City MPP is retrievable
Municipal and organizer information portals, including public information disclosure (PPID) pages	Jayapura City Government; DPMPTSP	Transaction volumes; processing times; published service standards	No performance series retrievable
Queue-management and ticketing records held at the site	DPMPTSP as organizer; participating institutions	Waiting and service intervals per counter; number of desks a citizen visits in one attendance	Not published. Reported as not integrated end-to-end across participants, so records would not link one citizen's transactions across desks.
Annual public service compliance assessment	Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia, national office and Papua representative office	Compliance with service standards at the level of the locality	Covers Jayapura City; measures standard compliance rather than processing time, throughput, or satisfaction, and is not disaggregated to the MPP
Annual reporting, Public Service Index, and MPP evaluation materials	Ministry of PANRB	Unit-level performance scores permitting national comparison	National aggregates only; no unit-level series for Jayapura
Independent research on the Jayapura City MPP, including institutional repositories	Universities and government service institutes	Independently collected survey or service-process data	One study located (Mirino, 2025) an IPDN diploma thesis based on fourteen interviews and site observation; reports perceived improvement but publishes no measured series

its qualitative design precludes developing a numerical metric to substantiate a statistical assertion about its effectiveness. The term is used in two distinct contexts below, each with a unique usage pattern. When observed features of the arrangement are reported, they are treated as independent field evidence, and their convergence with the documentary record is duly documented. When data is presented as figures on service time and satisfaction, it is to be regarded as a reported claim. In such cases, the data's provenance must be explicitly stated, and its limits clearly defined. This approach does not fall under measurement.

Data Analysis and Trustworthiness of the Data (Triangulation)

The corpus was analyzed thematically, with the three concurrent processes described by Miles & Huberman (2014) serving as the theoretical framework. During data condensation, the raw documents were

Table 3. Coding framework, document indicators, and documentary warrant

Code	Source framework	Indicator sought in the corpus	Documentary warrant	Corpus items
INN-ADV Relative advantage	Diffusion of innovations	Stated consolidation of previously dispersed services, and any measurement of benefit realized by users	Administrative statement; no measurement located (Table 2)	7
INN-COMP Compatibility	Diffusion of innovations	Alignment with the national bureaucratic reform agenda and the existing PTSP function	Express provision	1–4
INN-CPX Complexity	Diffusion of innovations	Coordination requirements, tenure arrangements, implementing rules still unsettled	Express provision and administrative statement	5, 7–9
INN-TRI Trialability	Diffusion of innovations	Phased or partial operation preceding the formal launch	Administrative statement	5, 7
INN-OBS Observability	Diffusion of innovations	Public inauguration, ministerial presence, national framing	Administrative statement; the releases are themselves instances of the attribute	6, 7, 9
ID-INS Constitutive instruments	Institutional design	Identity and legal rank of each instrument that establishes the arrangement	Express provision	1–5
ID-ADR Addressees and reach	Institutional design	Whom each instrument binds, and whether central vertical agencies fall within its scope	Express provision	1, 3–5
ID-OBL Obligation and service commitment	Institutional design	Whether participation is stated as a duty or as a consent, and whether service standards are specified	Express provision as to consent; express absence as to service standard	4, 5
ID-ENF Enforcement and review	Institutional design	Provisions for sanction, dispute resolution, and scheduled joint review	Express absence	4, 5
ID-ORG Organizer mandate	Institutional design	Authority conferred on DPMPTSP over the participating institutions	Express provision	3, 4
IND-AST Asset tenure	Inductive	Legal status of the building occupied by the MPP	Administrative statement; no tenure instrument in the corpus	4, 7
IND-DIG Digitalization gap	Inductive	Participation in the national Digital MPP scheme; infrastructure and literacy constraints	Administrative statement	8, 9
IND-SUP Supervisory dependence	Inductive	Frequency and function of central monitoring and assistance	Administrative statement	6–9

selected, simplified, and abstracted into codes linked to the concepts of innovation and institutional design. In the data display stage, the coded material was meticulously organized into thematic matrices, making the chronology of establishment and the structure of the rules governing participation clearly discernible. In conclusion, the findings were interpreted through the lenses of public sector innovation and institutional design following the processes of drawing and verification.

Two different approaches were used for the coding. We used two frameworks to create deductive codes, and we created inductive codes to capture themes that emerged from the text. These themes were not included in either framework. Every deductive code is defined so that the indicator it seeks is a property of a document: a clause, an addressee, a stated obligation, a specified consequence, rather than a property of conduct that a document might imply. Codes that would have needed behavioral evidence were not included in the framework at all, so Table 3 does not include any category where the corpus can be used instead of observation.

Each code's documentary basis needs its own rule, because a judgment of how strong the evidence is cannot be copied by another reader. No scale goes from strong to weak. Two common options were considered and dismissed. A frequency matrix, which records how often each code appears in the text, can be used to measure emphasis in discourse rather than the existence or force of a rule. A provision creating an obligation appears once in the article that enacts it, and appears no more often for being decisive. A phrase asserting a benefit may appear three times but has no legal weight. On a set of constitutive instruments, ranking by frequency would place rhetorical repetition above enacted rule and would invert the analysis this study performs. Saturation was set aside for a different reason. It is a way to stop the inductive research process when collecting information from a group of people. It marks the point at which collecting more information will not produce any new codes. This set of instruments is not a sample, but the complete set of instruments that make up the arrangement. They have been put together in order of enumeration, rather than by sampling. A closed set cannot be saturated. Saying that it has reached a saturation point would be wrong.

A determinacy rule is supported by a documentary corpus, and Table 3 is an example. Each code has a documentary warrant, which can be one of four values. Each assignment is based on a question with a definite answer, rather than a judgment of degree. Express provision: an operative clause in an instrument in the corpus settles the indicator. Express absence: the set of tools used to find this information does not include it. This means that the absence is a finding about the design, not a gap in the evidence. Administrative statement: the indicator is settled only by a descriptive statement in a government-authored release or report. This is a record of what an official body asserts, rather than what an instrument enacts. This issue has not been dealt with: nothing in the text mentions the indicator. Another column lists the documents where the warrant appears. These are numbered as in Table 1. This means that if a reader has the same nine documents, they can check each one against the text to see if it is correct. The rule is stated before the coding, rather than derived from it, and it allows disagreement about particular assignments without everyone agreeing on what an assignment means.

Applying the rule reveals a pattern previously obscured by the graded column. Each code within the institutional design group is evident as either an express provision or an express absence. The instruments' functionality and the constraints on their operation are discernible through careful examination of the accompanying text. Notably, no institutional design finding is contingent on the ministry's account of its own program. It is evident that each code that a graded scheme would have designated as intermediate, such as trialability, supervisory dependence, and asset tenure, is found to be founded on administrative statements. The distinction the old column blurred was therefore not one of degree but of kind, and it follows the study's central argument: the institutional design analysis rests on enacted text, while the diffusion attributes lean, at their weakest points, on official self-description.

Trustworthiness was pursued through source triangulation, comparing information across documents to establish consistency, and through an audit trail linking each analytical claim to a numbered item in Table 1. It is imperative that two qualifications are articulated in a clear and concise manner. First, the triangulation performed on the analytical corpus is internal, involving the comparison of one government-authored source with another. Ministry releases and cooperation agreements have been identified as instruments of accountability and publicity. These instruments prioritize achieving objectives over the challenges encountered during implementation. Establishing consistency between the official account and actual practice is not a primary

concern. Claims that depend on that correspondence, especially any claim that the facility benefits its users, are therefore not advanced. Secondly, the search documented in Table 2 identified a single independent study of the case, with no extant external material. This included the absence of a published satisfaction survey, a disaggregated oversight assessment under the MPP, and a monitoring report by a civil society organization. The study under discussion is employed in the subsequent section, where its relevance to the findings is highlighted. However, a record compared with a single unrefereed thesis is subject to a less rigorous examination. Consequently, the constraints reported below are more likely to be understated than overstated.

■ RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The National Policy Context of the Case

The national trajectory delineates Jayapura's position within the diffusion process. Table 4 documents the policy milestones and the cumulative count of MPPs at each stage.

From an analytical perspective, the salient consideration is not the annual totals themselves, but rather the shape of the curve to which they correspond. The period under consideration saw expansion reach near-static equilibrium between 2017 and 2020, then accelerate markedly from 2022 onwards. This acceleration is characterized by a specific regulatory event, namely the elevation of the legal basis from a ministerial regulation to Presidential Regulation No. 89/2021, accompanied by the subsequent issuance of technical guidance in Ministerial Regulation No. 92/2021. The question must therefore be posed: what is the rationale for a change in the rank of a regulation engendering a change in the rate of adoption? A thorough examination of the documentation has revealed three distinct mechanisms. A presidential regulation binds central vertical agencies, whose participation a ministerial regulation could only request, thereby reducing the coordination cost that would otherwise fall solely on each locality. This process effectively transforms MPP establishment from a discretionary local initiative into a performance expectation tied to bureaucratic reform assessment. This, in turn, alters the incentive facing a mayor or regent. A standard template is provided, including an organizer, service categories, and a cooperation mechanism. This template is available for subsequent adopters to use, obviating the need for them to engage in design. In accordance with the principles of diffusion theory, the regulatory measures in place reduced the perceived complexity of adoption for those who adopted the technology at a later stage (Rogers, 1995).

Jayapura entered at the most precipitous section of the curve, a factor that carries implications for interpreting the case. The

Table 4. Policy milestones and the cumulative number of MPPS, 2017–2025

Year	Cumulative MPPs	New per period	Policy milestone
2017	3	3	Ministerial Regulation No. 23/2017; pilots in DKI Jakarta, Surabaya, and Banyuwangi
2020	24	21	Plan announced to elevate the legal basis to a presidential regulation
2022	103	79	Presidential Regulation No. 89/2021 and Ministerial Regulation No. 92/2021 in force; simultaneous inaugurations
2023	152	49	Jayapura City MPP inaugurated on 19 May 2023 as the 120th MPP and the first in the Land of Papua.
2024	230	78	Universal-coverage target (514 localities) missed; coverage approximately 45 percent.
2025	305	75	Approximately 60 percent of regencies and cities; average of 155 service types per site

initial Papuan MPP experienced a period of accelerated development that the region itself did not initiate; frontier entry coincided with the most rapid phase of national expansion, yet did not contribute to its initiation. The drivers identified in the subsequent analysis are thus drivers of local adoption occurring within a favorable national window, and their explanatory weight should be assessed with that window in view.

Constituting the Innovation: A Diffusion-of-Innovations Reading

The establishment of the order was characterized by a sequential progression rather than a single act. Planning for the project formally commenced in October 2022, and several tenants, including the BPJS Kesehatan counter, began operating in early January 2023. On 26 January 2023, twenty-one institutions signed cooperation agreements, and the facility was inaugurated on 19 May 2023. Service consolidation continued into 2024. Two features of that sequence are analytically significant: a lead time of approximately seven months from the start of planning to inauguration, and the commencement of operations before the formal launch. Table 5 provides a comprehensive list of the institution's fixed attributes.

Interpreting these attributes through the lens of the five diffusion characteristics does more than label them; it helps distinguish among them, elucidating the factors that led to their successful adoption while also underscoring why their institutionalization has not been achieved.

The attribute of *relative advantage* is the one to which this corpus offers the least support, and it requires more care than the other four. In Rogers's formulation, the attribute is perceptual. That is, it concerns the degree to which an innovation is perceived as better than the preceding innovation, and the perception that drives adoption is that of the adopting unit. According to the aforementioned reading, the attribute is present, and its bearer is identifiable. The Jayapura City Government adopted this format, and the Ministry of PANRB promoted it on the stated ground that consolidation shortens the itinerary a citizen must complete. The corpus thus serves as a repository of evidence pertaining to the adopter's perceptions, and its admissibility is limited to this particular context.

The search documented in Table 2 identified a single independent study, the figures of which require the same discipline. Mirino (2025) reports that the mean time taken to complete business licensing and civil registration documents fell from between five and seven days to between one and three, and that an internal DPMPTSP satisfaction survey recorded a twenty-five per cent increase after the MPP began operating. The two figures indicate the direction the design is intended to go, and both are reported here because withholding evidence that favors the innovation would be as one-sided as accepting it uncritically. However, neither of these can be

Table 5. Institutional profile of the Jayapura city MPP

Attribute	Description
Legal basis	Presidential Regulation No. 89/2021; Ministerial Regulation No. 92/2021; Jayapura mayoral regulation; cooperation agreements signed by 21 institutions (26 January 2023)
Organiser	Jayapura City Investment and One-Stop Integrated Services Agency (DPMPTSP)
Location and tenure	Type-A Entrop Terminal building, occupied under a lend-for-use arrangement.
Participating institutions	21 institutions: 12 regional apparatus organizations, 4 central vertical agencies, 3 state- and region-owned enterprises, 2 social insurance administrators
Service coverage	Approximately 100 service types, including taxation, land affairs, policing documents, immigration, licensing, and population administration
Inauguration	19 May 2023, by the Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform; the 120th MPP nationally and the first in the Land of Papua

used as a measurement. The initial study is based on interviews and observational studies, rather than administrative records of processing time. The second report is a second-hand account of a survey that remains unpublished, with the instrument, scale, baseline, sample, and date not specified. A twenty-five per cent rise in an unspecified index against an unspecified baseline is not a quantifiable quantity, and the study that reports it disclaims any capacity to measure effectiveness numerically.

Consequently, the present study does not assert, at any point, that the Jayapura City MPP has reduced the time, cost, or number of visits that a citizen incurs. A novel observation emerges: the only independent evidence is that officials and users report improvement, even as queues at peak hours, network failures, and friction between participating agencies persist. The design is said to embody an intended advantage, but whether citizens have obtained one is not established here. The evidence that would establish this – the internal survey to which the study refers, and the transaction records held by the participating institutions – remains undisclosed.

This gap is twofold: a disparity in disclosure and measurement. This attribute further substantiates the argument. Notably, relative advantage is the only attribute among the five for which verification would require the innovation to generate data on its own effects. Such data appears to be generated, as evidenced by the internal satisfaction survey referenced in the sole independent study of the case. However, this data remains unpublished, undeposited, and inaccessible through any available channel. In contrast, facilities in regions with greater resources routinely publish analogous figures. When considered in conjunction with observability, the most prominent attribute in the set and the one intentionally cultivated at the inauguration, the pattern becomes discernible. In this paradigm, the tangible outcome of establishment is the primary incentive, while the quantifiable evidence of success is discreetly assessed and withheld from public scrutiny. Consequently, the prevailing incentive structure does not necessitate the conversion of adoption into demonstrable performance. The measurement gap is not merely an absence of evidence in this study; it is an inherent feature of the innovation diffusion process.

Compatibility is high and the least problematic of the five attributes. The MPP extends the existing PTSP function rather than displacing it, is administered by an agency that already held the one-stop mandate, and aligns with the national bureaucratic reform agenda to which the city is already accountable. Consequently, adoption did not require restructuring local governance or establishing an additional institutional framework.

The case diverges from Western adopters because of its *complexity*. Three sources of complexity are evident. Firstly, the coordination burden of assembling four central vertical agencies whose systems and reporting lines run to Jakarta has been documented. Second, the Entrop terminal building is occupied under a lend-for-use arrangement rather than ownership, leaving the facility's physical basis revocable. Third, the implementation of rules for the Digital MPP, which remained under revision throughout the observation period, has been reported. Rogers (1995) posits that complexity is the attribute most likely to retard diffusion. In this case, the issue is not the decision to adopt, which has already been made, but rather the subsequent deepening of that decision.

The concept of *trialability*, evident in the sequence, has received scant attention in the MPP literature. The counters opened in January 2023, four months before the ministerial inauguration in May. The innovation was therefore trialed in partial form before it was publicly committed to, which lowered the risk borne by both the city and the participating agencies. However, the same feature can be interpreted less benignly, in that the capacity to run the facility in partial form is precisely what makes co-location a stable resting point, since a partially populated MPP already functions well enough to be inaugurated.

Observability is the strongest attribute in the set and was deliberately produced. The inauguration of the Minister of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform, which was framed nationally as the inaugural MPP in the Land of Papua and the 120th overall, generated visibility far beyond the city. High observability has been shown to accelerate diffusion, and the same configuration of high observability and high compatibility has been shown to underpin adoption in the Poupatempo program in Brazil (Fredriksson, 2020) and the Huduma Centers in Kenya (Kipyego et al., 2026). However, observability is more beneficial for establishing the event than for integrating it. When observability is the strongest attribute, the incentive it generates is often limited to the ribbon-cutting ceremony.

Upon consideration of the profile in its entirety, it is evident that it exhibits an asymmetric nature. The attributes that drive adoption: compatibility, observability, and trialability, are all strong; the attribute that

governs depth and complexity is unresolved; and the attribute that would justify the exercise to citizens, realized relative advantage, is unmeasured – not merely absent from this corpus, but absent from the public record. This imbalance indicates the established order's rapid adoption of the innovation and its lack of subsequent evolution.

The composition of the arrangement reinforces the reading; however, composition alone understates the problem. The salient issue is not the categorization of the twenty-one participants into distinct types; rather, it is how their services are interdependent. Figure 2 illustrates this dependency. Nodes represent participating institutions, and a directed edge in the graph denotes that a document issued by the source institution is a stated prerequisite for the service delivered by the target institution. The edges are derived from published requirements associated with each service and are drawn only when the requirement is a standing rule rather than a matter of local practice; they do not represent observed transaction flows. The dashed boundary delineates the legal division explained below: each node in the left field is an addressee of the mayoral regulation, and no node in the right field is.

Two features of the network under scrutiny are identified as key arguments. The initial position is positional. The four central vertical agencies are located at the terminal positions, signifying the end of the chain. These agencies deliver tangible outcomes to citizens, such as land titles, passports, police certificates, and taxpayer numbers. Taxation, land affairs, policing, document issuance, and immigration are services not available to citizens at the local government level. These services necessitate the longest journeys to separate offices. The regional apparatus organizations occupy source positions, issuing the identity, family, tax, and duty documents that those outcomes presuppose. The regional side appears dominant at twelve of twenty-one when participants are counted; however, when the direction of dependency is considered, this is not the case. This is because a source document has no value to a citizen except as an input to something only a terminal agency can produce.




Figure 2. Documentary dependency network among the participating institutions

The second feature is that the terminal positions are located on the opposite side of the boundary. The instrument that can enforce a universal service standard, a uniform schedule, or a shared data interface reaches the institutions that supply the inputs and stops before the institutions that complete the transactions. The dashed edges serve to convey the same point, albeit in reverse. The organizer's licensing service depends on a taxpayer number, and its building approval depends on proof of land rights. Consequently, even the city desk, which is under its jurisdiction, cannot complete its work without documents issued by agencies over which it has no control. In other words, dependency is bidirectional across the boundary, whereas authority is unidirectional.

Two qualifications apply to the figure. The map is not a representation of behavior but a set of rules; it does not record how often each path is traveled, and the corpus contains no transaction data to weight the edges. Nine regional apparatus organizations, two social insurance administrators, and three enterprises are shown as unmapped entities. This is because the requirements consulted did not establish any standing documentary dependency between them and another participant. The absence of these subjects from the network should be considered a limitation of the mapping process rather than a finding about their contribution.

The chains, rather than being regarded as arrows, should be conceptualized as journeys. Registering a land title depends on submitting a civil registration document, a taxpayer identification number, and paying land and building transfer duty to the land office before the registration process begins. The passport application process requires various documents, including an identity card, a family card, and an officially validated birth certificate. Formalizing a small business requires a business identification number, which in turn depends on tax registration. Each desk is a constituent element of a chain in which the output of one desk is the input of the next. Each desk is documented: the requirements are published, and the edges in Figure 2 are drawn from them.

However, it is important to note that the subsequent element in a chain is not an outcome, but rather a conditional. This distinction must be clearly delineated, as the model's own rhetoric obscures this crucial difference. The proposition that co-locating a whole chain allows a citizen to complete it in a single attendance is the premise on which the one-stop-shop format is justified; however, this is not a finding in this study or in any source it consulted. The validity of this claim is contingent on the presence of specific instruments that can provide definitive evidence to substantiate the aforementioned assertions. The inquiry pertains to uniformity in staffing patterns across desks within a particular chain on a specific day, consistency in operational hours across different counters, acceptance of documents at one counter without re-verification, and initiation of a second transaction before completing the first. The present study refutes this assertion. This analysis focuses on structure. When only the first link in a chain is present, the facility reduces the duration of the first step and leaves the remainder to be traveled. Because the remaining offices maintain their own schedules and queues, potential savings from the first step may be offset by the coordination required for the others. In such circumstances, the facility risks becoming a mere information counter for services completed elsewhere. This is the outcome that the model was designed to prevent. The issue of thinness in vertical representation, therefore, does not stem from a concern over institutional balance. Rather, it is a matter of determining whether the innovation in question truly provides the anticipated benefits to those individuals who are subject to the most extensive chains.

The most evident way to resolve this issue is to refer to the operational record, which comprises queue-system logs and processing times from the facility itself. Two obstacles have been identified, the second of which is particularly instructive. The first issue pertains to the concept of availability: no such record has been published, and the search documented in Table 2 did not retrieve one. The second is architectural in nature. A queue log documents events that transpired at a particular point of sale, rather than providing a comprehensive account of individual experiences. To show that a chain was completed within a single attendance, the record must link a citizen's transaction at one desk to the same citizen's transaction at the next desk. This requires either a case identifier shared across the participating systems or user tracking. Neither of these factors is present. The participating institutions are reported to operate standalone systems without interoperability, and the online queue facility is reported not to run end-to-end, since users repeat the ticketing manually on arrival (Mirino, 2025). The absence of interoperability, which this study identifies as the arrangement's central deficit, is therefore also what prevents the arrangement from generating evidence about its own effect on citizens. The

measurement problem and the design problem are in fact the same.

It is more beneficial to specify what would resolve the issue than to assert an answer, and three designs would achieve this in ascending order of demand. A time-and-motion study at the site could record, for a sample of attendances, the desks visited, the waiting and service intervals at each, and whether the visit ended in completion or in an instruction to return. An exit survey could capture the same information from the user's perspective. This would include any transactions that the user attempted to make elsewhere, both before and after the relevant period. The absence of a case identifier shared across the participating systems indicates an inherent lack of interoperability in the arrangement. The generation of the record as a by-product of operation is a consequence of this inherent limitation. Integration would require a case identifier shared across the participating systems. Until such a time as one of these is in place, it is not possible to ascertain the effect of the Jayapura City MPP on the time a citizen expends from the record, and nothing in this study should be interpreted as indicating that such an effect is known to exist.

The Institutional Design of the Arrangement: Instruments, Addressees, and Enforceability

The second question is about how participation is formally designed and how far that design goes. The arrangement uses four instruments: rules made by the president, the minister, the mayor of Jayapura, and the people who agreed to work together on 26 January 2023. They differ in legal rank, whom they address, and what they require. The analysis focuses on these differences rather than on their number.

It is tempting to perceive the twenty-one signed agreements and the mayoral regulation as a complex institutional design. The evidence does not support this assumption, and the reason is legal rather than simply that the document does not explicitly state it. Under Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Formation of Legislation, as subsequently amended by Law No. 13 of 2022, a mayoral regulation constitutes a local law for the Jayapura City region, with exclusive application within the municipal boundaries. The mayor does not have the authority to control the various governmental entities responsible for taxation, land, law enforcement, and immigration. Each of these arms of government is subject to the oversight of its own ministry and is characterized by its own distinct set of regulations, budgetary processes, and performance evaluation mechanisms. The mayoral regulation merely designates a venue and a coordinator. The act does not engender an obligation whose violation would result in adverse consequences. This decision concerns the instrument itself, rather than any assumption about behavior. The text can be interpreted in several ways, including its position in the list of rules, without recourse to knowledge of subsequent agency actions.

The cooperation agreements are similarly limited in scope, and in this case, the corpus is not silent but explicit. As instruments, these devices are designed to record consent to place services at a designated location. A perusal of the clause-by-clause examination reveals the absence of any provision for sanction, the absence of any service-level standard that is enforceable against a participating agency, the absence of any dispute resolution mechanism, and the absence of any schedule of joint review. The corpus, being a comprehensive collection of constitutive instruments rather than a sample thereof, renders these absences positive findings about the design, not gaps in the evidence. This distinction separates them from any claim about undocumented conduct. The onus therefore falls on each agency to demonstrate a consistent willingness to comply, a finding consistent with national data that repeatedly indicates agencies can close or reduce staffing levels without facing repercussions (Ariyanti et al., 2024). The institutional design in the demanding sense, that is to say, rules that structure participation and are recognized as binding by all participants (Bryson et al., 2015), is present for the twelve regional units and largely absent for the four whose services citizens most need. A collaborative form has been formally adopted; however, the binding quality that would make the form operative has not yet been established.

The organizer's mandate exhibits a similar pattern. The mayoral regulation designates DPMPTSP as the organizer, a position that entails responsibility for the venue, coordination, and reporting. The aforementioned directive does not entitle the issuing party to mandate the deployment of a counteragent, nor does it empower them to withhold any assets of value from an agency that does not fulfill its obligations. Consequently, the organizer is constituted as a convenor with no significant influence. This is an inherent feature of the design, evident in the instrument itself, and it elucidates why the continuity of the arrangement is contingent on external factors rather than on internal mechanisms.

A single independent observation of the arrangement in operation is available, and it reports what the instruments predict on paper in practice. Mirino (2025) present a detailed analysis of fourteen in-depth interviews and on-site observations. Their findings reveal that the participating agencies operate under a range of standard operating procedures that are not uniform, with requirements stated at one counter differing from those stated at another. Furthermore, users are observed moving back and forth between agencies inside the MPP building because data are not synchronized. It has been reported that opening hours vary among participants because vertical agencies attend morning assemblies at their parent offices. This results in instances where a user who arrives cannot be assisted and must return on a different day. The report describes partner institutions that still operate in isolation, resulting in a lack of interoperability and duplicated data. It also highlights an online queue system that requires users to repeat information upon arrival and the absence of a cross-agency coordination team, despite the organizer's efforts.

Each of these phenomena appears to be the behavioral counterpart of a nonexistent rule. The absence of an enforceable service standard gives rise to non-uniform procedures. The absence of interoperability gives rise to unsynchronised requirements and desk-to-desk movement. The divergent opening hours that have been established are directly related to the reach problem that has been delineated above: the instrument that could compel a common schedule binds the twelve regional units and not the four whose parent ministries set their routines, so the morning assembly at head office takes precedence over the counter at the mall. A coordination team's failure to complete its work indicates a convenor lacking leverage. The convergence should not be exaggerated – the study was unrefereed, the informants were not referenced, and no measurements were provided – but it is the only independent view of this case available. It aligns with the documentary record rather than contradicting it.

Two aspects of this analysis are not addressed in the text and are instead better articulated here than deferred to the limitations. The study offers no assessment of the quality of the working relationships among the twenty-one institutions, of the deliberation that preceded the agreements, or of the leadership exercised in assembling them. These properties are inherent to conduct, and the existence of a corpus of instruments does not necessarily constitute evidence of conduct, particularly given their exclusion from the coding framework. The single field study referenced above does not address these properties either. It can be posited that the regulations, as formulated, do not require the arrangement to be maintained by any external factor other than goodwill. This may be a deficiency in the design, which a conducive relational environment might obscure rather than remedy.


This phenomenon directly influences the central finding. The documents under scrutiny establish the consolidation of institutions, that is to say, the establishment of a venue, a coordinator, and a roster of participants, without concomitant systems integration. The absence of inter-agency data interoperability, which the World Bank Group (2018) identifies as a prerequisite for genuine integration, is not addressed in the corpus. The one independent field study of the case notes its practical absence. The technical definition of co-location is consolidation without interoperability, and the evidence supports this condition.

Drivers of and Barriers to Sustainability

The third question pertains to the factors that both sustain and constrain the arrangement. As illustrated in Figure 3, the factors are mapped across six governance dimensions, with each dimension comprising both an enabler and a constraint operating within the same domain.

This pairing indicates a thematic linkage among the codes, rather than a statistical relationship. In each dimension, the factor that currently sustains the arrangement is the same factor that would expose it if conditions changed. As outlined in the mayoral regulation and confirmed at the signing, executive sponsorship is not transferable to a different officeholder. The cooperation agreements have limited binding force over vertical agencies, and the consolidated presidential-level legal basis, with implementing rules still under review, is a key factor. Intensive ministry supervision, which depends on that supervision rather than local capacity, is also a salient feature. The strategic terminal location has insecure lend-for-use tenure, and the city's absence from the national Digital MPP scheme's initial pilots is also notable (Kementerian PANRB, 2024).

The map should be read in its entirety. The map is asymmetric in a specific way. The enablers are discretionary in nature. This means that an officeholder's sponsorship, an agency's consent to an agreement, and a ministry's continuing attention can each be withdrawn without any formal act of revocation. This is precisely because no instrument obliges their continuation. The constraints are structural in



Dashed lines mark the tension between the enabler and the constraint operating on the same dimension.

Figure 3. Concept map of enablers, constraints, and the institutionalization gap

nature. Asset tenure, interoperable systems, and digital infrastructure and literacy each require sustained investment across several budget cycles to be eliminated. It is posited that an arrangement that is sustained by discretionary supports and counterbalanced by structural constraints is considered stable, provided that the requisite level of attention is maintained. Conversely, when this attention wanes, the arrangement becomes vulnerable. This configuration, rather than any individual barrier, is the key factor in explaining the innovation observed at co-location.

Comparison with Prior Studies

The aforementioned pattern contrasts sharply with the more optimistic claims about the transferability of the one-stop-shop model (Romero et al., 2022.) This finding is consistent with the observation of Bhuiyan & Abrar (2023), regarding the stagnation of digital service centers in Bangladesh, where staff shortages and minimal service renewal held the innovation at its initial form. The present study lends further support to the broader argument that administrative and technological innovations plateau at symbolic adoption in low-capacity environments unless they are institutionalized (Heeks et al., 2021; Meiyanti et al., 2019). The reliance on ministry supervision echoes the fragility Kipyego et al. (2026) observe in Kenya, where collaboration lacks sustained political and financial backing, and the weight carried by executive sponsorship in the absence of an enforceable design is consistent with Indonesian studies conducted in better-resourced settings (Enala & Vinsenco, 2025; Nurhamzah et al., 2025).

The distinctive contribution of the Jayapura case lies not in the model, which is nationally standardized. However, in its presence in a region facing severe geographic and infrastructural constraints, and in the substitution it makes visible: here executive sponsorship and central supervision stand in for the fiscal capacity that underwrites MPPs in the west. The distinction between symbolic adoption and substantive integration lies in institutionalization, encompassing legal consolidation, asset certainty, and systems interoperability, rather than mere establishment. To facilitate the relocation of the Jayapura MPP across that line, it is imperative to implement robust local regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, it is essential to ensure certainty regarding asset ownership and to allocate resources to develop interoperable digital systems aligned with the national Digital MPP scheme. (Kementerian PANRB, 2024; Pratama, 2018).

Limitations of the Study

The following four limitations must be borne in mind when considering the findings reported above. Firstly, the evidence base is exclusively documentary, and the analysis is correspondingly confined to rules-in-form. The study identifies the instruments constituting the Jayapura MPP that require, permit, and leave unaddressed; it establishes nothing about rules-in-use, how counters are staffed, how disagreements are settled, or how the participating institutions work with one another. Consequently, relational constructs were excluded from the framework, rather than reported as having only weak evidence, and no finding above is contingent on one.

Secondly, the corpus is dominated by sources produced by the institutions under study. The sole independent study to be found, which located an IPDN diploma thesis, is the only counterweight available; its findings are reported above, with their provenance and limits stated, and no analytical weight is attributed to its figures. Despite thorough research, we found no archival material from civil society organizations, oversight bodies, or independent monitors. Consequently, the constraints reported here are more likely to be understated than overstated.

Thirdly, no citizen users were surveyed or observed, and the search documented in Table 2 identified a single independent field study, but no measured series that would serve as a substitute for such observation. Each proposition herein concerning the impact of consolidation on citizens, including the discussion of document chains, is predicated on conditional statements derived from published documentary requirements and the model's design logic. However, no proposition provides a measurement. The operational record that would resolve the issue – namely, queue and processing logs capable of following one citizen across several desks – remains unpublished. Absent a case identifier shared across the participating systems, the arrangement in its present form does not generate this record. The study therefore reports no effect of the Jayapura City MPP on service time, cost, or user satisfaction, and no such effect should be inferred. Whether the facility delivers the advantage intended by its design remains an empirical question. The designs capable of answering this question are outlined above.

Fourthly, it is not possible to support comparative claims based on a single case in a single administrative area. The conclusions drawn in this case study about the relative importance of factors in low-capacity regions are not definitive, but provisional propositions. These propositions are then discussed in the conclusion.

■ CONCLUSION

The Jayapura City Public Service Mall is an innovative local governance initiative that consolidates approximately one hundred cross-agency services from twenty-one central and regional institutions at a single location. The establishment of the first MPP in the Land of Papua was achieved through a phased collaborative process, anchored in cooperation agreements and a mayoral regulation.

Theoretically, the case refines both frameworks through which it was read. In the context of public sector innovation theory, the study demonstrates that the diffusion attributes do not function as a unified entity. The findings reveal that compatibility, observability, and trialability were sufficient to facilitate the adoption of the innovation. Unresolved complexity was found to govern the extent to which adoption could be deepened, and realized relative advantage – the attribute that justifies the innovation to citizens – is not merely undocumented in this corpus but unmeasured in the public record. This is a finding about how the innovation has diffused, rather than a limitation of the study. In this reading, sustainability is not merely the continuation of an adopted form; rather, it is the conversion of adoption-driving attributes into depth-securing ones. Furthermore, nothing in the case suggests that the conversion occurs on its own. The case demonstrates that, in the context of the study of collaborative arrangements, formal agreements are not as robust a manifestation of institutional design as the extant literature on collaborative governance commonly implies. The extant literature on the subject treats institutional design as one of several factors to be taken into consideration, and proceeds rapidly to the question of process. However, the Jayapura record suggests that the condition is not satisfied by the mere presence of instruments, but rather by their legal reach. It is evident that a mayoral regulation lacks the capacity to impose binding obligations on central vertical agencies. The absence of enforceable standards or dispute mechanisms in such agreements engenders a scenario wherein compliance is contingent upon the presence of continuous goodwill. The distance between consolidation and integration is therefore not merely a deficit

of resources, but rather a deficit in the binding quality of the design. It is legible in the rules as written before any question of relational quality arises.

Operationally, the same deficit manifests as unresolved building tenure, thin digital infrastructure and literacy, slow uptake of the national Digital MPP scheme, and implementing regulations still under revision, which collectively impede the arrangement from attaining substantive integration. Notably, no published measurement of the facility's own performance exists. Ministerial Regulation PANRB No. 14 of 2017 already obliges every service unit to survey user satisfaction periodically. The results of that survey, together with transaction volumes and processing times, are a published condition of MPP status. The requirement to share a case identifier across participating systems so that a record follows the citizen rather than the counter would convert an existing obligation into an instrument of accountability. Furthermore, it would provide a basis for measuring future studies of this case. The significance of these constraints lies in their manifestation as the tangible embodiment of the theoretical deficit, rather than as the study's primary intellectual contribution.

The hypothesis that in regions of limited capacity, the trajectory of service innovation is shaped more by institutional design and central supervision than by fiscal capacity is advanced here as a hypothesis for testing rather than as an established conclusion. A solitary documentary case in a single administrative area is inadequate to substantiate a comparative claim. No fiscally well-resourced region was examined alongside Jayapura, and no measure of local fiscal capacity was correlated with any outcome. To test the aforementioned hypothesis, a design would need to be formulated that enables a comparison of MPPs across regions with differing fiscal capacity. Furthermore, the design would need to operationalize relational and behavioral constructs independently of documents produced by the relevant actors. Finally, it would be necessary to measure integration through service-process and user-side evidence.

Future research should compare institutional designs across several MPPs in eastern Indonesia. Furthermore, the corpus should be extended beyond constitutive instruments to include minutes and transcripts of inter-agency coordination fora where access can be negotiated. In addition, in-depth interviews, direct observation, administrative records of transaction volume and processing time held by the participating institutions, and citizen satisfaction surveys should be utilized. The chain argument should be tested directly through a record that follows one citizen across several desks. This will enable an empirical examination of rules in use and, consequently, the innovation's sustainability, rather than inference from the official record.

■ AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Y. R. Murafer designed the research and drafted the manuscript; T. L. Safkaur collected and curated the documentary and archival data; E. M. J. Kocu conducted the thematic analysis; J. Yumame developed the theoretical framework and reviewed the manuscript; Ivana and M. Sinaga supervised the research and finalized the manuscript. All authors have read and approved the final version of the manuscript.

■ DISCLOSURE OF GENERATIVE AI AND AI-ASSISTED TECHNOLOGIES

During the preparation of this manuscript, the author(s) utilized Gemini Auto Revise to assist in refining sentence structure, improving grammar, enhancing academic language, and translating selected parts of the text. Following the use of this tool, the author(s) carefully reviewed, edited, and verified the generated content. The author(s) accept full responsibility for the accuracy, originality, integrity, and final content of this article.

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